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[577] 
Secure the Smartphone, Secure the Future: 
Biometrics, Boyd, a Warrant Denial and the 





The growing use of biometric technology—fingerprints, facial 
recognition and beyond—for data safekeeping—particularly for smart 
phones, personal computers, and identification—has raised a number of 
questions for Constitutional scholars.  What Constitutional protections, if 
any, does biometric information have?  Does biometric information require 
a warrant for law enforcement officers to compel its production?  Would 
compelling production of a biometric password effectively force defendants 
to testify against themselves?  Should the growing use of biometric 
information, by both private third parties and law enforcement, lead courts 
to reexamine prior precedents regarding privacy interests in personal 
technology and personal physical characteristics?  This paper examines 
turns to a decision from the United States District Court of Northern 
California to find answers.  That decision, while limited, reflects Supreme 
Court concerns about technology and offers a line of reasoning that could 
lead to heightened Constitutional protection for biometric information.  This 
paper in turn argues that such protection, based on a more conjoined reading 
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, is necessary to prevent a new era of law 








1.  Aaron Chase is a third-year law student at the University of California, Hastings College 
of the Law, where he is completing concentrations in Criminal Law and Government Law. During 
his time at UC Hastings, he has extensively studied the powers and limitations on law enforcement 
while working as a law clerk for two California district attorney offices, the United States Attorney’s 
Office for the Northern District of California, and the San Francisco City Attorney’s Office. He also 
serves as an editor for the Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Police descend upon a home in Oakland, California.  They knock loudly, 
announce themselves, then enter under color of law when the door is opened; 
upon entrance, they lawfully arrest two individuals accused of engaging in 
extortion, extortion principally engaged in via Facebook Messenger.  The 
police visually inspect the premises and lawfully seize electronic devices in 
a relatively routine arrest, until they compel both arrestees to place their 
thumbs on their smart phones’ fingerprint scanners so that their phones’ 
password protections unlock.  Then a third individual walks out of the 
bathroom; this individual is the target of no investigation and not 
immediately subject to lawful detention or arrest.  The police nevertheless 
detain the individual, seize the phone in her hand, and upon her refusal to 
unlock her phone, physically compel her to hold her head in place until the 
phone’s facial recognition software engages and the phone unlocks. 
The situation described above reflects what law enforcement officers 
sought in a 2019 warrant request.2  As biometric technology becomes more 
integrated with personal technology, and as both become more ubiquitous, 
courts struggle to understand when and how police may use technology 
without intruding upon constitutional rights.3  The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California disapproved this particular 
warrant request.4  That denial, when taken in combination with recent and 
past court precedent, suggests that courts may have found a way to adapt the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Information Age in order to protect 
individual rights during a time of everchanging technology. 
This paper argues that the courts should embrace the reasoning behind 
district court’s warrant denial, particularly a more expansive and linked 
interpretation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment; in doing so, the Court 
would create a stronger shield against technological intrusion by the 
government into enumerated and unenumerated rights, thus fulfilling the 
original purpose of the amendments.  As argued below, there is ample 
precedent, both current and dormant, from the Supreme Court and lower 
courts alike, that supports the use of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as 
bulwarks against law enforcement efforts to use technology to circumvent 
reasonable warrant requirements.5  There is, however, opposing precedent 
 
2.  In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
3.  See People v. Davis, 2019 CO 24, ¶ 21.  (“Advances in the technology of encryption have 
further complicated the law surrounding cell phone searches . . .  While the government is equipped 
with technology that allows it to bypass many cell phones’ security measures, courts have started to 
grapple with what to do in the case of an unbreakable lock.”). 
4.  In re Search, 354 F. Supp 3d. at 1013. 
5.  See, e.g., Bryan H. Choi, For Whom the Data Tolls: A Reunified Theory of Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 185, 189-90 (2015) (discussing Boyd v. 
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which renders law enforcement free to view those amendments as 
inapplicable to technological, and notably biometric, intrusion into the 
personal sphere.6  When deciding between these two paths, the courts should 
consider the pervasiveness of biometrics and other technologies into the 
everyday lives of Americans, and how the eventual omnipresence of 
biometrics may ultimately allow law enforcement to broadly disregard 
traditional warrant requirements and other constitutional protections on 
individual privacy. 
In 2019, law enforcement officers in Oakland requested a warrant to 
compel the availability of biometric features for all individuals at a private 
residence, named and unnamed, for the purpose of unlocking digital devices 
and searching their contents.  That was denied by United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California, in a decision authored by United 
States Magistrate Judge Kandis Westmore.7  Officers had argued that such 
access was needed to reach lawful evidence, evidence that here could help 
convict those alleged to have threatened a victim with the release of a 
personally damaging video.8  The district court rejected this argument and 
held that: (1) compelling individuals not identified in the warrant to provide 
biometric information was overbroad and counter to the Fourth Amendment; 
and (2) the use of a biometric features to unlock an electronic device is 
testimonial and therefore protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause.9  The court tied its decision to two principles 
articulated in previous court holdings.  The first principle is that individual 
rights should not be “diminished . . . due to the advancement of 
technology.”10  The second is that smart phones and other items of personal 
technology are more akin to documents than storage equipment and are 
therefore entitled to a high degree of privacy protection.11  These principles 
are both well-rooted and far-reaching in what they could mean for 
technological privacy rights.  The first part of this paper will deal in greater 
depth with that district court decision and what led to it. 
The second part of the paper will discuss the counter-precedent to that 
line of reasoning.  A 2014 decision in Virginia held that, while a defendant 
could not be compelled to produce a phone’s passcode, due to its testimonial 
nature, he could be compelled to unlock the phone with a fingerprint 
identification; according to the Virginia court, a fingerprint involved no 
mental process and was therefore non-testimonial and unprotected by the 
 
United States, 116 U.S.  616 (1886)); see also, e.g., Riley v. Cal., 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
6.  See, e.g., State v. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 2018). 
7.  In re Search, 354 F. Supp 3d. at 1013. 
8.  Id. at 1013, 1016. 
9.  Id. at 1013-1018. 
10.  See Carpenter at 2204 (quoting Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S.  27, 34 (2001)). 
11.  In re Search, 354 F. Supp 3d. at 1017 (citing Riley v. Cal, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014)). 
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Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.12  This decision has origins in 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s repeated refusal to recognize heightened privacy 
expectations or self-incrimination concerns in personal biological material, 
even when that material had identificatory properties.13  The Court has also 
previously been willing to set aside privacy concerns regarding technology 
where that technology was owned in part by a third party.14  Applying these 
precedents to a biometrically-locked phone, filled with data owned by third 
parties, the Virginia court’s interpretation of the law seems understandable. 
The third and fourth parts of the paper will discuss the changing 
technological environment, how the courts may appraise that environment, 
and why the Court should ultimately embrace the decision of and principles 
behind In re Search.  As discussed in the paper’s third part, it seems highly 
likely that technology will become more and more tied to personal use and 
personal biology; it also seems likely to become even more ubiquitous and 
perhaps more egalitarian in distribution.  Were the courts to embrace these 
trends as subservient to and in service of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, 
it could hail a new era for individual freedom and perhaps even equal 
protection of the law in criminal matters.  Were the courts to reject that 
interpretation, those amendments could become increasingly archaic as law 
enforcement utilizes technology to intrude further and further into the 
personal sphere.  As discussed in the fourth part, the reasoning behind Judge 
Westmore’s decision, taken together with other court decisions and existing 
precedent, offers the Supreme Court a body of reasoning with which to 
reestablish the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as a conjoined defense against 
over-intrusion, technological and otherwise, by law enforcement into the 
personal sphere. 
 
II.      DISTRICT COURTS TAKE ON WARRANTLESS 
BIOMETRICS 
 
Judge Westmore’s decision produced headlines in a number of 
publications, but it’s impact on the wider body of law is yet to be 
determined.15  A warrant denial by a single magistrate judge in a federal 
 
12.  See Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 271 (Va. Cir. 2014). 
13.  See Md. v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013); see also Schermber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(1966). 
14.  See Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
15.  See, e.g., Megan Trimble, Police Can’t Force You to Unlock Your Phone with Your Finger 
or Face, California Judge Says, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 14, 2019, 1:52 PM), https://www. 
usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2019-01-14/police-cant-force-you-to-unlock-your-phon 
e-with-biometrics-california-judge-says; see also Thomas Claburn, Cops Told: No, You Can’t Have 
a Warrant to Force A Big Bunch of People to Unlock Their Phones By Fingerprint, Face Scans, 
THE REGISTER (Jan. 14, 2019, 10:46 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/01/14/biometric_ 
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district court is not a binding authority, not “in either a different judicial 
district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different 
case.”16 As the decision relates to the interpretation of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, it may or may not be viewed as persuasive authority by the 
state and federal courts that are most likely to deal with warrant requests or 
other matters of criminal law.17  Here, the question becomes whether the 
reasoning within the decision will weigh persuasively upon future decisions 
in an increasingly important aspect of criminal procedure. 
In the warrant denial, In re Search of a Residence in Oakland relies on 
a two-factor analysis.  First, there is a relatively brief analysis of the warrant 
request in Fourth Amendment terms.18  The court notes that sufficient facts 
exist to believe that evidence of crime will be found, but that that does not 
sanitize a violation of constitutional rights.19 Here, the court finds that the 
government would violate individual rights under the Fourth Amendment by 
not identifying a “particular person nor a particular device” in both its warrant 
requests to seize electronic devices and compel submission of biometric 
features for the sake of unlocking those devices.20 
The second, more comprehensive prong of the court’s two-factor 
analysis invokes Fifth Amendment privileges.21  The court first notes that the 
Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination and that the relevant 
question here is whether the act to be compelled, in this case “the use of a 
suspect’s biometric feature to potentially unlock an electronic device” is 
testimonial.22  The court examines what distinguishes an act as testimonial, 
noting that ‘“an act of production’ . . . ‘that impl[ies] assertions of fact can 
constitute testimonial communication’ before holding here that that the ‘use 
 
device_access; see also Ryan Whitman, Judge: Police Can’t Force You to Unlock Phone With 
Fingerprint or Face ID, EXTREME TECH (Jan. 14, 2019, 8:43 PM). 
16.  Camreta v. Greene 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (citing 18 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 134.02 (3d ed. 2019)). 
17.  “The decisions of the lower federal courts on federal questions are merely persuasive.  
Where lower federal court precedents are divided or lacking, state courts must necessarily make an 
independent determination of federal law.”  Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. San Diego, 51 Cal. 2d 759, 764 
(1959). 
18.  In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1013-1014 (N.D. Cal. 
2019). 
19.  Id. at 1013 (“[i]f, however, law enforcement violates another constitutional right in the 
course of executing a warrant, it inherently renders the search and seizure unreasonable.”). 
20.  Id. at 1014 (noting the government sought “any individual, who is found at the Subject 
Premises and reasonably believed by law enforcement to be a user of the device, to unlock the 
device using biometric features[.]” The court held that “[S]earch and seize all digital devices at the 
Subject Premises is . . . overbroad[.]”).  
21.  Id. at 1014-18. 
22.  Id. at 1014–15 (“[T]he question, then, is whether a suspect can be compelled to use his 
finger, thumb, iris, or other biometric feature to unlock a digital device” and “the proper inquiry is 
whether an act would require the compulsion of a testimonial communication that is 
incriminating.”); see Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). 
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of biometric features is testimonial . . . .’”23 
The court relies on two assertions to hold the use of biometric features 
as testimonial.  First, the court compared the use of biometric features to an 
act protected by the Fifth Amendment—the use of a passcode to lock or 
secure an electronic device.24  The court found biometric features to be 
equivalent because, like a passcode, a biometric lock is “security feature to 
ensure that someone without the passcode cannot readily access the contents 
of the phone.”25  Indeed, the court noted the reason the government seemed 
to express “urgency” in its request to compel use of biometric features was 
to “bypass the need to enter a passcode” as “a passcode is generally required 
‘when a device has been restarted, inactive, or has not been unlocked for a 
certain period of time.’”26  Second, the court compared the use of biometric 
features to an act generally unprotected by the Fifth Amendment—requiring 
a suspect to submit to fingerprinting.27  The court reasoned that biometric 
features are unlike submitting fingerprints because a biometric feature 
“confirms ownership (or access) and control” of a device and “all of its digital 
contents” for a “particular” individual, which is fundamentally different from 
the “physical evidence” created by a fingerprint when compared to “existing 
physical evidence (another fingerprint) . . .”28  The court also indicated that 
smartphone applications may allow access to “ personal, private 
information—including medical records and financial accounts” that would 
be traditionally protected by a phone’s passcode in lieu of a biometric lock, 
thus further distinguishing biometric features from fingerprinting.29  Thus, by 
its analogous function to a numeric passcode and its purpose in protecting 
 
23.  In re Search, 354 F. Supp 3d. at 1015 (relying on Doe v. U.S., 487 U.S. 201, 208 (1988) 
and In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 
2012) (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410)). 
24.  Id. at 1015–16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (relying on Doe, 487 U.S at 219) (“A defendant 
can be compelled to produce material evidence that is incriminating . . . but I do not believe he can 
be compelled to reveal the combination to his wall safe—by word or deed.”) (The Doe majority 
agreed with the dissent on this particular point.  See Doe, 487 at 210 n.9.); accord U.S. v. Kirschner, 
823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (“[F]orcing the Defendant to reveal the password for the computer 
communicates that factual assertion to the government, and thus, is testimonial[.]”); See also United 
States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2009); see also In re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *4 (“A 
password, like a combination, is in the suspect’s mind, and is therefore testimonial and beyond the 
reach of the grand jury subpoena.”), rev’d, 2009 WL 424718 (reversing because the modified 
subpoena sought the unencrypted data rather than the password itself). 
25.  In re Search, 354 F. Supp 3d. at 1015–16. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. at 1016. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id.; cf. Robert H. Cauthen, The Fifth Amendment and Compelling Unencrypted Data, 
Encryption Codes, and Passwords, 41 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 119, 121 (2017) (“The word ‘witness’ 
in the constitutional text limits the relevant category of compelled incriminating communications to 
those that are ‘testimonial’ in character.’” In other words, that means disclosing ideas, information, 
data, concepts, knowledge, and thoughts.” (citation omitted) (quoting Hubbell, 530 U.S at 34)). 
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sensitive personal information, the court held that a biometric lock is 
testimonial and thus protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
The court also concludes that the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine does 
not apply to the use of biometric features.30  Under the Forgone Conclusion 
Doctrine, an act of production cannot be testimonial if the contents of what 
is to be produced is already known to the government.31  The court stated that 
the doctrine applies where “the Government can show that no testimony is at 
issue . . .” and does not apply where the government “cannot show prior 
knowledge of the existence or the whereabouts of the documents ultimately 
produced  . . .”32  The court finds that, in consideration of the large amount 
of data held within smartphones, the government “inherently lacks the 
requisite prior knowledge of the information and documents that could be 
obtained via a search of these unknown digital devices, such that it would not 
be a question of mere surrender.”33  Additionally, the court noted that the 
government would “be unable to articulate facts” compelling biometric 
unlocking when requesting a search warrant where it “could not possibly 
anticipate” the presence of unknown persons.34 
Throughout the decision, the court expresses concern that “technology 
is outpacing the law . . .”35  Citing a recent Supreme Court decision, the court 
notes that “[c]itizens do not contemplate waiving their civil rights when using 
new technology . . .”36  Thus, while the government may have “an interest in 
accessing the contents of any electronic devices” new technology does not 
allow the government to “trample on” constitutional rights.37 So strong is the 
court’s defense of this principle that the court implies that the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment prevent the government from ever being able to “ access 
the complete contents of a digital device.”38  Of note, the court blends 
protections from those two amendments in articulating that defense; it 
couches a Fourth Amendment defense of a “degree of privacy” within its 
Fifth Amendment analysis.39  To the court, both amendments serve to protect 
 
30.  In re Search, 354 F. Supp 3d. at 1016–18. 
31.  See Cauthen, supra note 29, at 124 n.26 (“It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the 
existence and possession of the papers rises to the level of testimony within the protection of the 
Fifth AmendmentFalse ‘The question is not of testimony, but of surrender.’”) (citation omitted) 
(citing Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)). 
32.  In re Search, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1017 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 
670 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11 Cir. 2012)). 
33.  Id. at 1017–18 (citation omitted). 
34.  Id. at 1018. 
35.  Id. at 1014. 
36.  Id. at 1014–15 (citing Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018)).. 
37.  See id. at 1016. 
38.  See id. 
39.  See id. at 1014 (quoting Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). 
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individual rights, especially in the face of changing technology.40 
 
A.   Precedent Behind In re Search of a Residence in Oakland 
 
In re Search of a Residence in Oakland does not exist in isolation.  It 
cites a number of cases.41  Among those is a recent decision by United States 
Magistrate Judge M.  David Weisman of the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, which features similar 
reasoning in similar circumstances.42  In this recent decision, the government 
sought to seize and remove “various forms of electronic storage media” from 
a premises pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.43  As part of 
that seizure, the government sought to compel individuals present at the scene 
to provide fingerprints or thumbprints in order to open electronic devices.44  
The court authorized the seizure, but denied the request to compel production 
of fingerprints for the purpose of opening electronic devices.45 
Like the Oakland search warrant denial, this decision relies on a “cross 
section of protections provided by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.46  This 
court held that there is no Fourth Amendment issue in the “privacy interests 
of a fingerprint” nor is there a Fifth Amendment interest in “the production 
of physical characteristics.”47  However, the court held that there can be a 
Fourth Amendment interest in “the context” in which fingerprints are taken 
and that the forced application of fingerprints to an electronic device by “any 
individual at the subject premises” is beyond the government’s authority 
under the Constitution.48  As in the Oakland decision, the court here cites the 
idea that “an act of production” can be testimonial in finding that “Fifth 
Amendment concerns” are present in this case.49  As directly cited in the 
 
40.  See id. at 1014 n.1, (noting that a suspect arrested under warrant does not waive the right 
to incrimination). 
41.  See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct.; Riley v. Cal., 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
42.  In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
43.  Id. at 1066–1067 (“A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of 
electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information. Unless 
otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent 
with the warrant.  The time for executing the warrant in Rule 41(e)(2)(A) and (f)(1)(A) refers to the 
seizure or on-site copying of the media or information, and not to any later off-site copying or 
review.” (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B))). 
44.  Id. at 1067 (“[I]n its warrant application, the government also seeks the authority to 
compel any individual who is present at the subject premises at the time of the search to provide his 
fingerprints and/or thumbprints ‘onto the Touch ID sensor of any Apple iPhone, iPad, or other Apple 
brand device in order to gain access to the contents of any such device.’”). 
45.  Id. 
46. Id. at 1068. 
47.  Id. at 1070. 
48.  Id. at 1070, (relying on U.S. v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 752 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
49.  Id. at 1072–74 (“We do not believe that a simple analogy that equates the limited 
protection afforded a fingerprint used for identification purposes to forced fingerprinting to unlock 
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Oakland decision, the court here invokes the privacy concerns attached to 
modern cellphones to differentiate compelling production of a biometric 
fingerprint as opposed to compelling production of a fingerprint.50  Both 
courts note the seriousness of the government’s concerns while still denying 
the search warrant application under constitutional concerns.51  While the 
language of this decision’s conclusion is not as strong or far-reaching as the 
Oakland decision, in both cases the courts come to the conclusion that the 
government cannot compel the production of biometric features to unlock an 
electronic device.52 
As both decisions employ analysis under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment, both employ case precedent relevant to each Amendment.  A 
separate analysis of the precedents shows how each Amendment produces 
relevant concerns for privacy interests in the face of advancing technology.  
There is, as explained below, a potential direct nexus between the two 
Amendments in existing case law. 
 
1. Fourth Amendment Precedent 
 
Under the Fourth Amendment, “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”53  When applying the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment to government attempts at search and 
seizure within the bounds, or lack thereof, of modern society, the courts 
consider foremost the test laid down in Katz v. United States.54  By then, 
 
an Apple electronic device that potentially contains some of the most intimate details of an 
individual’s life (and potentially provides direct access to contraband) is supported by Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence.” (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 1335, 
1345(11th Cir. 2012)) (citing Curcio v. U.S., 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)). 
50.  In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 
(“As Judge Weisman astutely observed, using a fingerprint to place someone at a particular location 
is a starkly different scenario than using a finger scan ‘to access a database of someone’s most 
private information.’” (citing In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 1073)). 
51. In In re Search, “[T]he Court sympathize[d] with the Government’s interest in accessing 
the contents of any electronic devices it might lawfully seize.”  354 F. Supp. 3d at 1116.  The Court 
also reasoned in In re Application for a Search Warrant, “the Court sympathizes with the 
Government’s interest in accessing the contents of any electronic devices it might lawfully seize.”  
236 F. Supp. 3d at 1068. 
52.  In re Search, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1118; In re Application for a Search Warrant 236 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1074. 
53.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
54.  389 U.S. 347 (1967).  But cf. U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (holding that 
the warrantless placement of a GPS device on a vehicle was a search due to the government’s 
physical intrusion, or trespass onto private property, likening such an action to actions proscribed 
against at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s enactment).   
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Supreme Court had previously declared that the Fourth Amendment applied 
beyond the “ more common tangible fruits of unwarranted intrusion.”55  The 
Court had declared that the Fourth Amendment mandated a right to privacy 
that required exclusion of illegal evidence in a criminal case.56  The Court 
had also already expressed a wariness as to electronic surveillance and its 
intrusions into personal affairs.57  In Katz, the Court struck down an attempt 
by the FBI to listen to a suspect’s telephone conversation via an “electronic 
listening and recording device” without a warrant on the basis on the Fourth 
Amendment.58  A concurrence within that decision, by Justice John Marshal 
Harlan II, used the Court’s reliance on privacy in reaching its conclusion to 
develop a two-prong test: “[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”59  This “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test is still often determinative of what receives 
Fourth Amendment protection from search or seizure without a warrant.60 
Courts, however, have struggled with the application of this test to 
evolving technology.61  One noted scholar in the area acknowledged that 
there are three ongoing issues regarding “new technology” and the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment: (1) the “technologically innovative form” of 
electronic records and their comparison to other records; (2) third party 
consent issues that come with electronic access to personal information; and 
(3) shared access to electronic information and the potentially reduced 
expectation of privacy that comes with it.62  These concerns have often made 
Court decisions regarding the Fourth Amendment and technology hard to 
 
55.  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (citing Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U. S. 471 (1963)). 
56.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of 
privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the 
Federal Government.”). 
57.  Berger, 388 U.S. at 49 (“The law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not kept pace 
with these advances in scientific knowledge.”). 
58.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 354 (“The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using 
the telephone booth, and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
59.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting “that electronic, as well as physical, intrusion 
into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
60.  U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (‘“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places,’ and . . . a violation occurs when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy[.]’” (citation omitted) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360)). 
61.  Wayne R. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 
2.6(f), (5th ed. 2018) (“[A]pplication of the Katz formula is especially problematical in the present 
context, involving ‘new technologies,’ for ‘societal expectations linked to a technology evolve with 
time.’ (quoting Ryan C. Reetz, Warrant Requirement for Searches of Computerized Information, 
67 B.U. L. Rev. 179, 197 (1987)). 
62.  See Lafave, supra note 61. 
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predict.63  This uncertainty exists in spite of the fact that computers and the 
Internet are ubiquitous and important to “increasingly large segments of 
society.”64 
Smith v. Maryland crystallizes the Court’s issues with shared data and 
third-party consent.65  The Court had previously held that there was no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information that is “voluntarily 
conveyed” and owned by a third-party.66  In Smith, the Court held that the 
warrantless monitoring of telephone communications via a “pen register” 
was permissible because: (1) the pen register monitored records that were 
held by a third-party, here a telephone company and that therefore the suspect 
“assumed the risk” of disclosure67; (2) the pen register did not acquire the 
“contents of communications” as occurred during the wiretapping in Katz.68  
Notably, the third-party doctrine has been used to compel the disclosure of 
subscriber information given to an Internet service provider.69  However, the 
courts have repeatedly defended an justified expectation of privacy where the 
content of conversations, messages or files is involved.70 
However, the Supreme Court has signaled that it is interested in 
safeguarding “the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary 
invasions by governmental officials . . .” and thus there is a likelihood that 
 
63.  Id. (“In part the uncertainty is attributable to the Supreme Court’s overall approach to 
questions regarding the Fourth Amendment’s scope, involving a balancing of privacy claims against 
crime control interests, which for various reasons means that the ‘choice of values and the legal 
reasoning that will be used in future cases are difficult to predict.’” (citing Randolph S. Sergent, A 
Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV. 1181, 1193 
(1995)). 
64.  Id. (citing Terri A. Cutrera, The Constitution in Cyberspace: The Fundamental Rights of 
Computer Users, 60 U.M.K.C. L. REV 139 (1991)). 
65.  Smith v. Md. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
66.  U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, (1976).  See also U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
67.  “When . . . petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone phone 
company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the normal course of business . . . [he] 
assumed the risk that the company would reveal to the police the numbers he dialed.”  Smith, 442 
U.S. at 744–36; cf. Miller, 442 U.S. at 435. 
68.  Smith, 442 U.S. at 741, (quoting U.S. v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U. S. 159, 167 (1977) 
(“the use of a pen register whether a communication existed. These devices do not hear sound.  They 
disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed—a means of establishing 
communication.  Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of 
the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.”). 
69.  See Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1226 (10th Cir.2010) (requiring that that registered 
sex offender report “his online identifiers” to state does not violate Fourth Amendment). But see 
U.S. v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1047 (8th Cir.2017) (holding that a search technique targeting IP 
addresses is a search where it violates a suspect’s “reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents 
of his personal computer.”). 
70.  See Reetz, supra note 61; see also Sergent, supra note 63. But See Orin Kerr, Do Users 
of Wi-Fi Networks Have Fourth Amendment Rights Against Government Interception? THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 24, 2012, 6:17 pm) http://volokh.com/2012/09/24/fourth-amendment-
rights-for-users-of-wi-fi-networks-both-encrypted-and-unencrypted/. 
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courts will not bless future warrantless searches no matter how cloaked they 
are in technology.71  Three recent Supreme Court decisions show that the 
Court is willing to invoke Fourth Amendment protections in the face of 
technological innovation.  In United States v. Jones, the Court held that 
attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.72  The majority opinion there relied not on the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, but on the “physical intrusion” of the government 
in placing a GPS on a suspect’s car, which the Court described as a personal 
“effect”.73  Of particular note is the concurrence of Justice Sotomayor, who 
observed: 
 
People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their 
cellular providers, the URLS that they visit and the e-mail 
addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service 
providers, and the books, groceries and medications they purchase 
to online retailers . . .  I would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited 
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.74 
 
While Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence was not joined by any other 
justice, it echoes a dissent from Smith v. Maryland.75 It also foreshadows the 
privacy concerns that Sotomayor and other justices broadcast in the hearing 
for Carpenter.76 
In 2014, the Court came forward with an even stronger application of 
the Fourth Amendment to personal privacy rights and property.  In Riley v. 
California, the Court concluded that a warrant is required to search digital 
 
71.  Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & 
Cty of S.F., 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967)). 
72.  U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012). 
73.  Id. at 404–405 (held a “vehicle is an effect” under United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1, 12, (1977)) (Later, the majority noted that “[i]t may be that achieving the same result through 
electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but 
the present case does not require us to answer that question.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 412. 
74.  Id. at 418. 
75.  Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Cal. Bankers 
Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 95–96 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
76.  Amy Davidson Sorkin, In Carpenter Case, Justice Sotomayor Tries to Picture the 
Smartphone Future, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-
columnists/carpenter-justice-sotomayor-tries-to-picture-smartphone-future (quoting Sotomayor, J., 
‘“If it’s not O.K. to put a beeper into someone’s bedroom, why is it O.K. to use the signals that 
phone is using from that person’s bedroom, made accessible to law enforcement without probable 
cause?”‘). 
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information from a mobile phone.77  The Court notes that as mobile phones, 
particularly smart phones, are closer to a “minicomputer” in nature, searching 
them while searching a person is not simply a “narrow intrusion on 
privacy”:78 
 
Modern cell phones are not just another technological 
convenience.  With all they contain and all they may reveal, they 
hold for many Americans “the privacies of life.”79  The fact that 
technology now allows an individual to carry such information in 
his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the 
protection for which the Founders fought.80 
 
2. Fifth Amendment Precedent and Counter-Precedent 
 
In accordance with the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, no person under the jurisdiction of the Constitution “shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”81  Courts 
have interpreted this clause to mean that persons under the jurisdiction of the 
Constitution are protected from compelled testimonial self-incrimination.82  
This right is broad and expansive: 
 
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United, States 
gives absolute protection to a person called as a witness in a 
criminal case against the compulsory enforcement of any 
criminating testimony against himself.  He is not only protected 
from any criminating testimony against himself relating to the 
offense under investigation, but also relating to any act which may 
lead to a criminal prosecution therefor.83 
 
At least three required elements are necessary for the invocation of the 
Fifth Amendment’s protection: “(1) compulsion, (2) a testimonial 
 
77.  573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). 
78.  Id. at 394. 
79.  Id. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
80.  Id. 
81.  U.S. CONST. amend. V, §3. 
82.  Paul Cassell & Kate Smith, The Fifth Amendment Criminal Procedure Clauses, THE 
NAT’L CONST. CENT., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amend 
ment-v/clauses/632 (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) (“The Supreme Court has many times affirmed the 
most natural understanding of these words: the defendant in a criminal case cannot be compelled to 
testify . . .”). 
83.  Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 630 (1896). 
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communication or act, and (3) incrimination.”84  Indeed, In re Search of a 
Residence in Oakland holds that the proper inquiry into a violation of Fifth 
Amendment rights involves where an act in question involves all three 
elements.85  However, the focus of the Fifth Amendment reasoning within 
that case is on what is testimonial.86 
The Court has held that there is an ‘“absolute right not to testify’” that 
extends beyond trial.87  The Court has also held that testimony is not simply 
limited to oral communication.88  It can include written words, gestures 
intended to communicate, and physical evidence and acts that compel 
“responses that are essentially testimonial.”89  Yet that privilege against 
compelled testimony does not extend to the compulsion of “real or physical 
evidence” alone, at least not under the Fifth Amendment.90  For an act to 
qualify as testimonial, it must require the defendant to “disclose the contents 
of his own mind.91 
Much of the debate as to whether an act is testimonial revolves around 
“acts of production” and when an act constitutes the contents of a defendant’s 
mind.92  The acts of production doctrine comes from Fisher v. United States, 
where the Court ruled that compelling a third-party to produce a defendant’s 
 
84.  In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11 Cir. 2012); see also 
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004). But see Cauthen, supra note 29, at 120 
(arguing there are four separate elements to be considered: (1) Compelled, (2) Criminal Case, (3) 
Witness, and (4) Against Himself.).  
85.  In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 
(“The proper inquiry is whether an act would require the compulsion of a testimonial 
communication that is incriminating.”). 
86.  Id. (“Here, the issue is whether the use of a suspect’s biometric feature to potentially 
unlock an electronic device is testimonial under the Fifth Amendment.”). 
87.  Salinas v. Tex., 570 U.S. 178, 184 (2013) (citations omitted). 
88.  See Michael S. Pardo, Self-Incrimination and the Epistemology of Testimony, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1023, 1027-28 (2008) (citing Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966)). 
89.  Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S at 764).   
90.  In re Search, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1015 (“The distinction which has emerged, often 
expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or 
‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical 
evidence’ does not violate it.”).  But see Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764 (“To compel a person to submit 
to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of 
physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth 
Amendment.”). 
91.  Curcio v. U.S., 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957); see also Peter Thomson, The Fifth Amendment’s 
Act of Production Doctrine: An Overlooked Shield Against Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 
20 FED. SOC. REV. 5 (2019) (“[W]hen the government compels a witness ‘to use the contents of his 
own mind’ to communicate something factual, the communication is equivalent to testimony and 
the Fifth Amendment bars the government from compelling its disclosure.”). 
92.  Id. at 6 (“[B]ecause of the lack of judicial clarity regarding the meaning of ‘testimonial,’ 
criminal practitioners might find it difficult to discern the circumstances under which an act of 
production is protected by the Fifth Amendment, particularly since no bright line test has been 
established by the Supreme Court.”). 
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documents, where those documents are not protected by another right or 
privilege, does not involve incriminating testimony and therefore does not 
invoke Fifth Amendment protection.93  However, the Court affirmed that the 
act of producing evidence in response to a government order has 
communicative aspects of its own beyond the contents of the evidence, as it 
concedes the existence of the evidence, its control and possession by the 
defendant; the Court stated that whether these elements proved to be 
testimonial would depend on the particular facts of the case.94  A Fisher 
concurrence by Justice Brennan came to a stronger conclusion: 
 
Many of the matters within an individual’s knowledge may as 
easily be retained within his head as set down on a scrap of paper.  
I perceive no principle which does not permit compelling one to 
disclose the contents of one’s mind but does permit compelling 
the disclosure of the contents of that scrap of paper by compelling 
its production.95 
 
While Brennan’s concurrence is Fisher is not binding, it did pave the 
way for strong links between acts of production and testimony.  In United 
States v. Doe (1984), the Court took the Fisher decision’s reasoning as to 
“communicative aspects” and held that an act of production was testimonial 
where the production concedes the “existence, possession, and authenticity” 
of the evidence.96  A later, separate decision in Doe v. United States (1988) 
re-affirmed the acts of production doctrine to compel disclosure of foreign 
bank records, holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause could only be used 
to “resist compelled explicit or implicit disclosures of incriminating 
information.”97  However, the dissent’s argument that the government could 
force someone “to surrender a key to a strongbox containing incriminating 
documents,” but not “to reveal the combination to [a] wall safe[,]”98 affirmed 
by the majority,99 has formed the basis for repeated holdings that passwords 
 
93.  See Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 392 (1976).   
94.  Id. at 419 (Brennan, J., concurring) (‘“that the privilege protects an accused . . . from being 
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial 
or communicative nature . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761)).  
95.  Id. at 420 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
96.  U.S. v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).   
97.  Doe v. U.S., 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988).   
98.  Id. at 219.  But see Orin Kerr, The Fifth Amendment and Touch ID, WASH. POST: THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/ 
wp/2016/10/21/the-fifth-amendment-and-touch-id/?utm_term=.41ca1c7d93aa (“The problem is 
that this passage is really vague.  Stevens wrote that a person may ‘in some cases’ be forced to 
surrender a key, but that suggests that there are other cases in which a person couldn’t be forced to 
surrender a key.”). 
99.  Doe, 487 U.S at 210 n.9. 
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are protected by the Fifth Amendment.100 
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privileges were further defined in 
United States v. Hubbell.101  Under Hubbell, the government could not order 
production of documents if the government could not demonstrate, with 
reasonable particularity, that the documents existed and were in the 
possession of the defendant.102  Additionally, the documents were protected 
not just if they contained incriminating evidence, but would ‘“furnish a link 
in the chain of evidence’” needed to prosecute a crime.103  The Court also 
stated that the “Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination [only] 
applies to acts that imply assertions of fact.”104  ‘“[I]n order to be testimonial, 
an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a 
factual assertion or disclose information . . . .’”105  While the decision itself 
related to testimony and documents ordered produced by subpoena, the 
concurrence notedly pointed out that at the time of the Fifth Amendment’s 
creation, the privilege against self-incrimination was widely held to grant a 
right against giving or furnishing evidence.106  This concurrence could 
provide a pathway for a more expansive reading of the Fifth Amendment than 
provided for by the Hubbell majority.107 
However, Hubbell also reaffirmed a serious limiting factor to the self-
incrimination privilege by stating that acts providing evidence that is not 
testimonial in nature is not protected.108  Particularly excluded were acts 
exhibiting “physical characteristics” that are not analogous to communicative 
acts expressing or implying assertions of fact or belief.109  This exception had 
previously been used to force compulsion of various acts, including 
providing blood, handwriting, and voice samples, along with standing in a 
lineup and wearing a particular piece of clothing.110  Effectively, the 
 
100.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668-69; Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 
Va. Cir. 267 (Va. Cir. 2014); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 1335, 1345-46 
(11th Cir. 2012); SEC Civil Action v. Huang, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127853, at *3-7 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 23, 2015).  But see Phillip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 195 (arguing that if the password is physically recorded somewhere, the 
government can subpoena the production of that password). 
101.  U.S. v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
102.  Id. at 28. 
103.  Id. at 38 (quoting Hoffman v. U.S., 341 U.S. 479 (1951)). 
104.  Id. at 36 n.19. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. at 50-52; See also John Duong, The Intersection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
in the Context of Encrypted Personal Data at the Border, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 313, 330 (2009).   
107.  See Duong, supra note 106, at 332 n. 98. 
108.  Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36.   
109.  Id. at 35 (citing Pa. v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 594-598 (1990)).   
110.  See Doe, 487 U.S. at 210; Gilbert v. Cal., 388 U.S., 263, 266-267 (1967) (handwriting 
exemplar); U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (voice exemplar); U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S., 210, 
221-222 (1967) (standing in a lineup); Holt v. U.S., 218 U.S. 245, 252-253 (1910) (wearing a 
particular piece of clothing).   
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decisions hold that “[t]he Fifth Amendment does not protect against forced 
physical acts.”111  The most common reasoning behind these exclusion is that 
such acts are not testimonial because they do not disclose the contents of the 
mind.112  As one scholar puts it, “Communications requiring extensive mental 
use are testimonial, and those requiring little are not.”113 
 
III. A FUTURE WHERE BIOMETRICS ARE NOT 
PROTECTED BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
 
As more people have smartphone that are locked using fingerprint or 
facial recognition locks, law enforcement have included language in warrants 
to compel the unlocking of phones via  these methods.114  The line of 
precedent distinguishing physical acts that do not involve “cognitive content” 
or “implied communications” has led a number of scholars that the use of 
biometrics to encrypt a phone is not protected under the Self-Incrimination 
Clause.115  A number of courts have now agreed with that reasoning.116  If 
this reasoning is embraced by higher courts and law enforcement, the 
consequences for society at large could be severe and far-reaching. 
Commonwealth v. Baust, a 2014 Virginia Circuit Court decision, may 
be the first decision explicitly dealing with biometric smartphone 
passwords.117  There, police sought to compel a defendant to produce video, 
possibly stored on his phone, that may have recorded him assaulting a victim 
within defendant’s bedroom.118  Defendant’s phone was protected by both 
passcode and fingerprint encryption, and defendant claimed that both of these 
are testimonial and production of either of these would violate his rights 
under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.119  The court 
first held that the existence and location of the contents of the phone are a 
foregone conclusion and not protected by any Fifth Amendment right.120  
 
111.  See Dan Terzian, The Micro-Hornbook on the Fifth Amendment and Encryption, 104 
GEO. L. REV. 168, 169 (2016).   
112.  See Dan Terzian, The Fifth Amendment, Encryption, and the Forgotten State Interest, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 298, 304 (“Many compelled acts . . . do not require meaningful mental use, so they 
are not testimonial.”). 
113.  Id. 
114.  E.g., In re Search of, 317 F. Supp. 3d 523 (D.D.C. 2018); In re Application for a Search 
Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (N.D. Ill. 2017); In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. 
Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
115.  Terzian, supra note 112, at 304-305; see also, e.g., Cauthen, supra note 29, at 12; Lafave, 
supra note 61, at §2.2(f).   
116.  E.g., Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267 (Cir. Ct. 2014); ST. v. Diamond, 905 
N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 2018). 
117.  89 Va.  Cir. 267 (Cir. Ct. 2014). 
118.  Id. at 267-68.   
119.  Id. at 268. 
120.  Id. at 269 (quoting Doe v. U.S. (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 
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However, it did hold that passcode was testimonial and protected.121  It held 
the opposite for fingerprints—the government could compel the defendant to 
produce a non-testimonial fingerprint to unlock the phone:122 
 
The fingerprint like a key, however, does not require the witness 
to divulge anything through his mental processes.  On the 
contrary, like physical characteristics that are non-testimonial, the 
fingerprint of Defendant if used to access his phone is likewise 
non-testimonial and does not require Defendant to ‘communicate 
any knowledge’ at all.  Unlike the production of physical 
characteristic evidence, such as a fingerprint, the production of a 
password forces the Defendant to ‘disclose the contents of his own 
mind.  For this reason, the motion to compel the passcode should 
be DENIED but the motion to compel the fingerprint should be 
GRANTED.’123 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court came to similar reasoning in State v. 
Diamond.124  Reaffirming an earlier decision by the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals,125 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a defendant, suspected of 
involvement in a home burglary, could be compelled to provide a fingerprint 
to unlock his phone under threat of civil and criminal contempt.126  The court 
held that providing fingerprint are not testimonial because the “compelled act 
merely demonstrated Diamond’s physical characteristics and did not 
communicate assertions.”127  The court held that “merely providing” the 
fingerprint here could not involve a “mental process” because the defendant 
did not have to “self-select” the finger used to unlock the phone or even be 
“conscious” for the application.128  Thus, because providing the “physical 
characteristics” of the fingerprint involved no mental process and because the 
compelled act did not determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence on the 
basis of physiological responses, providing the fingerprint for the purpose of 
 
2004)).   
121.  Id. at 270 (citations omitted). 
122.  Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 271. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Diamond, 905 N.W.2d at 870.   
125.  ST. v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143 (Minn. Ct. App., 2017). 
126.  Diamond, 905 N.W.2d at 872, 878. 
127.  Id. at 878. 
128.  Id. at 877.  But see Kerr, supra note 98 (Stating that where the government doesn’t know 
the owner of the phone, compelling a person to biometrically unlock a phone in question “implies 
testimony because Touch ID is programmed to respond to only one body part. That choice of body 
part acts like a password . . . [S]o responding to the order by unlocking the phone using the correct 
body part tends to show that the person is the owner.”). 
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unlocking the phone could not be testimonial.129  Like Baust, Diamond rules 
conclusively that where physical characteristics do not communicate 
assertions of fact from a defendant’s mind, they cannot be testimonial, 
leaving biometric locks unprotected by the Fifth Amendment under current 
precedent.130 
There are also cases and scholars who go beyond the reasoning 
articulated in Baust and Diamond in terms of seeking to limit the self-
incrimination privilege in regard to passwords and biometrics.131  Judge 
Charles Breyer of the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California reasoned in United States v. Spencer that a rule where the 
government can never compel decryption of a password-protected device 
leads to “absurd results.”132  Instead, courts should consider access to 
encrypted data based on whether the “foregone conclusion rule” applies to 
the encrypted data or passwords.133  “Whether turning over material, either 
in the form of documents or bits, implicates the Fifth Amendment should not 
turn on the manner in which the defendant stores the material.”134  Dan 
Terzian argues that passwords, and the encrypted data they protect, should 
not be protected in the same manner than safe combinations are.135  Instead, 
courts should consider a “fair state-individual balance” that “where there is a 
societal need to limit” the Self-Incrimination Clause, the state should permit 
compulsion upon defendants.136  Terzian argues that this is possible as there 
is only no “absolutes” within the values underlying the Fifth Amendment and 
only a “strong preference” for not permitting compulsion;137 Terzian argues 
that as data encryption is increasingly used, it will become “unfairly difficult” 
to prosecute crimes with balancing Fifth Amendment interests more toward 
state interests.138 
An examination of current circumstances shows some of the risks of 
weighing the balance of state-individual interests further toward the state.  As 
 
129.  Diamond, 890 N.W.2d at 877-888 (citation omitted). 
130.  Id. at 878.   
131.  See, e.g., Terzian, supra note 112; U.S. v. Spencer, No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 70649 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2018). 
132.  Spencer, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70649, at *5 (“Whether a defendant would be required 
to produce a decrypted drive would hinge on whether he protected that drive using a fingerprint key 
or a password composed of symbols.”). 
133.  Id. at *6-*8 (holding that the government should be held to establish with “reasonable 
particularity” that it had independent knowledge of the “existence, possession, and authenticity” of 
the information requested. (quoting U.S. v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); cf. 
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605 (Mass. 2014) (arguing that password encrypting 
computer was a foregone conclusion). 
134.  Spencer, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70649, at *6-*7. 
135.  Terzian, supra note 112, at 306. 
136.  Id. at 307.   
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. at 309-10. 
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is, roughly three-quarters of Americans use smartphones, and an increasing 
number use biometric locks due to their convenience, without consideration 
of the risk biometrics may pose to their Constitutional rights.139  Furthermore, 
this risk may phone more heavily, as it often does, on African-Americans, 
and others who are less likely to buy more expensive smartphones with 
“panic buttons” that disable biometric locks in favor of passcodes.140  To 
definitively make biometrics unprotected would deny a massive number of 
Americans the privacy they expect to have in their smartphone sand would 
likely disproportionately affect vulnerable segments of American society.141 
It is also likely that the government exposure of private data and records 
via biometrics will continue to expand.  An FBI program called Next 
Generation Identification is engaged in expanding biometric interoperability 
across all branches of the government.142  This program seeks to have 
biometric information—fingerprints, palm scans, iris scans, facial and scar 
recognition, and more—taken from local, state, and federal background 
checks, criminal and otherwise, and place this information in a single 
database, accessible by local, state and federal government agencies.143  At 
the same time, federal authorities have been using genetic information 
gleaned from private databases (mostly used for genealogy) for criminal law 
enforcement;144 beyond privacy concerns, this is notable as genetic 
information is now being used to make advanced biometric locks for the sake 
of data encryption.145 
The government would likely argue that such information is being 
gathered either voluntarily, from latent sources or from less-protected 
societal segments like immigrants and criminals.146  However, these 
databases have led to the retention of data from lawful, natural-born 
 
139.  See Riana Pfefferkorn, Oh, So Everybody’s a Legal Expert Now: Minnesota v. Diamond, 
Microsoft Ireland, and User-Hostile Path Dependence in the Law, THE CENT. FOR INTERNET & 
SOC’Y. AT STAN. L. SCH., (Jan 19, 2018) http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2018/01/oh-so-every 
body%E2%80%99s-legal-expert-now-minnesota-v-diamond-microsoft-ireland-and-user. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Next Generation Identification (NGI) Documents, UNCOVERING THE TRUTH, http:// 
uncoverthetruth.org/foia-documents/ngi-documents (last visited Apr 10, 2019). 
143.  Secure Communities and Next Generation Identification: The FBI’s “Big Brother” 
Surveillance Agenda, UNCOVERING THE TRUTH, (July 6, 2011), http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/7-6-11-Scomm-NGI-Fact-Sheet.pdf. (last visited Apr 10, 2019). 
144.  See Natalie Ram, The U.S. May Soon Have a De Facto National DNA Database, SLATE: 
FUTURE TENSE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/national-dna-database-law-
enforcement-genetic-genealogy.html. 
145.  See Pierluigi Paganini, The Future of Data Security: DNA Cryptography and 
Cryptosystems, SECURITY AFFAIRS (Feb. 15, 2015), https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/33879/ 
security/dna-cryptography.html. 
146.  See Ram, supra note 144; supra note 142; supra note 143. 
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citizens.147  Data that can be easily accessed and used by the government 
against individuals without Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection for 
biometrics.  Without the democratic consent of the American people, which 
has not yet been given, the surrender of massive amounts of personal data  to 
the government for use in criminal prosecution seems less like a balancing of 
interests between the state and individuals and more like an abrogation of 
individual Constitutional protections for the sake of government 
convenience.148 
 
IV.      BIOMETRICS AND THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE 
FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS 
 
Were the Supreme Court to decide that biometric locks deserve 
Constitutional protection, it could very well decide to accept that biometric 
locks are analogous to passcodes, as in In re Search of a Residence in 
Oakland.149  In light of the Court’s manifested reservations about advancing 
technology,”150 the Court could extend a reasonable expectation of privacy 
to personal biometric and genetic information, thus granting heightened 
Fourth Amendment protection.151  To limit attempts by law enforcement to 
use sweeping techniques to unlock phones of individuals not specifically 
mentioned in a warrant,152 the Court could enforce a “reasonable 
particularity” standard when the government seeks to have a cell phone or 
electronic device unlocked or unencrypted.153  All of these measures would 
potentially increase the level of protection for the biometric encryption that 
Americans increasingly rely on.154 
However, these protections may not be sufficient to prevent digital 
devices from “betray(ing) us” to law enforcement.155  The foregone 
conclusion doctrine may allow forced decryption of a digital device, and 
while some courts require “reasonable particularity” or knowledge of a 
 
147.  Id. 
148.  See Ram, supra note 144 (discussing attempts to set up compressive expansion of 
Arizona’s DNA database and the opposition with which the effort was met). 
149.  In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1015-16 (N.D. Cal. 2019); 
See also In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1073-74 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
150.  Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). 
151.  See Ram, supra note 144.   
152.  See In re Search, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1013 
153.  See U.S. v. Pearson, No. 1:04-CR-340, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982 (N.D.N.Y. May 
24, 2006); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 
(2d Cir. 1993) (holding the standard the government must meet for required production is reasonable 
particularity). 
154.  See Pfefferkorn, supra note 139. 
155.  See Choi, supra note 5, at 187.   
9 - CHASE_HRPLJ_V17_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/30/2020  11:20 AM 
598 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL Vol. XVII 
“certain file” to invoke the doctrine, this is not a universal standard.156  “Other 
courts apparently require only that the government know of the potential for 
unencrypted files, even if it doesn’t know the contents of those files because 
they’re encrypted.”157  There is also the required records doctrine, which is 
rarely invoked but could lead to troubling government actions if it was.158  
Under the doctrine, if the government were to stipulate that a specific type of 
record must be kept by law, then those types of records are categorically 
excluded from the privilege against self-incrimination.159  Thus, even with 
increased constitutional protections, the government could continue to force 
decryption of smartphone, perhaps without specific knowledge of the records 
it was searching for, or simply mandate that certain records be kept on 
smartphones and access those without invoking Fifth Amendment 
protections.160 
There is case that may point to a more comprehensive protection of 
individual Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in the face of government 
attempts at technological intrusion—Boyd v. United States.161  The case is 
referenced within the dicta of In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 
specifically within a citation to the 1988 Doe case, which derives the quote 
“[t]he expression of the contents of an individual’s mind falls squarely within 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment[.]” from a reading of Boyd.162  Boyd 
is also quoted in Carpenter, where the opinion argues that the Fourth 
Amendment seeks to “secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary 
power.’”163  The Boyd references in these cases are not essential to their 
 
156.  See Terzian, supra note 111, at 173 (citation omitted) (requiring “knowledge as to the 
files on the hard drives” and [w]here the location, existence, and authenticity of the purported 
evidence is known with reasonable particularity, the contents of the individual’s mind are not used 
against him, and therefore no Fifth Amendment protection is available.”). 
157.  Terzian, supra note 111, at 173-74; see also U.S. v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 
(D. Colo. 2012) (stating that “[t]he fact that [the government] does not know the specific content of 
any specific documents is not a barrier to production”); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated April 
18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 910 (“the government’s knowledge of the existence and possession of the 
actual documents, not the information contained therein, that is central to the foregone conclusion 
inquiry.”). 
158.  See Choi, supra note 5, at 188-89; see e.g., Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the 
Privilege Against Self- Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 73 (1986) (“The Supreme Court has 
been wary of embracing the required records rule, and government authorities have been markedly 
reluctant to rely on it.”). 
159.  Choi, supra note 5, at 188-89. 
160.  Id. 
161.  116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
162.  In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1015 (quoting Doe v. U.S., 
487 U.S. 201, 219 (1988) (Stevens, J. Dissenting) (citing Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616, 633-
635 (1886). 
163.  Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (quoting Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) 
(noting that the Boyd quotation does specifically refer to the Fourth Amendment, but to the opinion 
in totality as relating to its analysis of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment). 
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holdings, but both allude to the principle elucidated in Boyd—that the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments both exist to secure the “very essence of 
constitutional liberty and security” against “invasion” of “sacred right(s).”164 
Boyd occurred in response to an 1874 federal statute that compelled 
defendants in revenues cases under federal court jurisdiction to produce 
private books, invoices and papers at court, lest the government attorney’s 
allegations be taken as confessed.165  Following a civil action under customs 
revenue laws, relating to unpaid customs fees on glass vases where the 
government first seized the vases before compelling the business responsible 
to turn in financial invoices, the Court held the law unconstitutional.166  The 
Court held that the seizure efforts ran afoul of both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments: 
 
[W]e are . . . of opinion that a compulsory production of the 
private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be 
forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against 
himself within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure—and 
an unreasonable search and seizure—within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.167 
 
The Court also held that the two amendments have an “intimate 
relation” and mutually “throw great light on each other” as both relate to the 
personal security of the citizen.168  For the purposes of protecting private 
papers against government scrutiny, the Court effectively fused the two 
amendments.169 
Boyd’s linking of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is no longer 
considered good law.170  However, despite one Supreme Court concurrence 
 
164.  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
165.  Id. at 617. 
166.  Id. at 617-18 (noting that the court also held that the civil action undertaken by the 
government was of a “quasi-criminal” nature due to the penalties and forfeitures for which a 
defendant would liable if committing an offense against the law). 
167.  Id. at 634-35. 
168.  Id.at 633. 
169.  Choi, supra note 5, at 189. 
170.  Choi, supra note 5, at 192 (“Conventional wisdom has now traveled the opposite 
extreme, with most jurists convinced the two Amendments share no overlap at all.”); see also e.g., 
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976) (“Several of Boyd’s express or implicit 
declarations have not stood the test of time.”); Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757, 760–72 (1966) 
(noting that the values of the two amendments “substantially overlap” but not their application). But 
see Richard A. Nagareda, Compulsion “To Be a Witness” and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1575, 1642 n.254 (1999) (“The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved the Fifth 
Amendment status of personal diaries and the like.”). 
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declaring Fisher’s act of production doctrine the “death knell” of Boyd,171 the 
Court has never expressly overruled Boyd’s absolute protection of private 
papers.172  Boyd is also increasingly found in the dicta of cases dealing with 
smartphones and data encryption.173  Perhaps, in light of the growing dangers 
of government technological intrusions into personal spheres, the Court 
should reconsider whether or not the central holding of Boyd was correctly 
decided.174 
One scholar, Bryan H.  Choi, argues that “[t]he basic tenet of Boyd was 
that a person’s essential “self’ extends beyond his ephemeral thoughts and 
speech to his tangible papers and effects.175  It is within that meaning that 
“compulsory production of the private books and papers” of a person was 
equivalent to “compelling him to be a witness against himself.176  Choi argues 
that this comports with the modern use of technology like smartphones, 
where the massive amount of personal data stored within works like an 
“artificial extension” of one’s brain and a “virtual extension” of the person.177  
Using this construct, the focus of a court inquiry, vis-à-vis a government 
seizure and/or compelled production/decryption of personal technology, is 
not the nature of that technology but the “character of the government’s 
action.”178  The fundamental question would be—whether by subpoena, by 
warrant, or without either—is the government trying to avoid proper 
Constitutional process through technology?179  Were this the focus of Court 
reasoning, as opposed to which Fourth and Fifth Amendment exceptions 
 
171.  U.S. v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The notion that the 
Fifth Amendment protects the privacy of papers originated in Boyd v. United States, but our decision 
in Fisher v. United States sounded the death-knell for Boyd.”). But see Choi, supra note 5, at 248 
n. 337 (quoting H. Richard Uviller, Foreword: Fisher Goes on the Quintessential Fishing 
Expedition and Hubbell Is off the Hook, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 315 n.20 (2001)) 
(“Boyd itself was shot down more than once, only to rise again like a Phoenix.”). 
172.  Duong, supra note 106, at 333 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414) (majority declining to 
consider whether the Fifth Amendment would protect a taxpayer from producing his own tax 
records). 
173.  See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 U.S. at 2214-17; Riley, 573 U.S. at 403; People v. Davis, 2019 
CO at ¶19.  But see Carpenter, 138 U.S at 2253-2255 (Thomas J., dissenting) (accusing the majority 
of “resurrecting Boyd”); cf. Carpenter, 138 U.S at 2271 (Gorsuch J., dissenting) (which is wary of  
“a return” to Boyd but urges the court to reconsider the scope of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
based on original interpretations of the amendments). 
174.  See Choi, supra note 5, at 246. 
175.  Id. at 189; cf. Alito, supra note 158 (“Boyd was more a defense of property than of 
privacy.”). 
176.  Choi, supra note 5, at 246 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35); see also Fisher v. U.S., 
425 U.S. 391, 405 (1976) (“The proposition that the Fifth Amendment prevents compelled 
production of documents over objection that such production might incriminate stems from Boyd v. 
United States.”). 
177.  See Choi supra note 5, at 244. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id.; see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (noting Court’s exhortation for the government 
to fulfill its Constitutional obligations and “get a warrant.”).  
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might apply, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments may more closely fulfill their 
purpose as protections of the “indefeasible right of personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property.”180 
To properly constrain and further elucidate this interpretation of Boyd, 
one may look to the original jurisprudence and legal atmosphere at the time 
of the creation of the Bill of Rights, as the Supreme Court increasingly does 
today.181  The Fourth Amendment protects “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects” against “unreasonable search and seizures.”182  A dictionary from 
1755 defines “paper” as “substance on which men write and print” and 
defines “effects” as “goods (or) movables.”183  It would not be a stretch to 
define a smartphone as both a movable good and a substance upon which 
people write and print, thus granting personal smartphones Fourth 
Amendment protection; likewise, it doesn’t strain credulity to says that 
biometrics—fingerprint, facial shape, genetic markers—are part of the 
“person” that is to be protected by the Fourth Amendment.  As for the Fifth 
Amendment, it is accepted that at the time of its creation, the Fifth 
Amendment applied to “natural persons” as opposed to artificial entities.184  
There is also a colorable argument that the Fifth Amendment was intended 
to be more expansive: that a “witness” was intended to mean “a person who 
gives or furnishes evidence” and that therefore the amendment was intended 
to protect against the compelled giving or furnishing of evidence.185  These 
interpretations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, considered together, 
would produce a body of law that provided heightened protections against 
search and seizures of persons and their personal devices, including their 
biometrics, and heightened protections against compelled production of 
records.  This would likely be more in line with the original interpretations 
 
180.  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
181.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (Applying a traditional trespass-based 
analysis to a Fourth Amendment question as opposed to the more modern reasonable expectation 
of privacy test.). 
182.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
183.  SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 675,1446 (1st Folio, 
1755), https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/page-view/ (last accessed April 13, 2019). 
184.  See Alito, supra note 158, at 190; see also Choi, supra note 5, at 240 (citing Braswell v. 
U.S., 487 U.S. 99, 119 (1988)) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Our . . . decisions concerning artificial 
entities and the Fifth Amendment . . . illuminated two of the critical foundations for the 
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination: first, that it is an explicit right of a natural 
person, protecting the realm of human thought and expression; second, that it is confined to 
governmental compulsion.”). 
185.  See Duong, supra note 106, at 330-31; see also U.S. v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49 (2000)  
(Thomas, J. concurring) (Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, reasoned that “the Fifth 
Amendment privilege protects against the compelled production not just of incriminating testimony, 
but of any incriminating evidence” and expressed a willingness to “reconsider the scope and 
meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause”). 
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Public comment on In re Search of a Residence in Oakland was varied 
and included some criticism.187  This is understandable.  The majority of Fifth 
Amendment precedent and scholarship interprets most physical 
characteristics, and therefore likely biometrics, as nontestimonial and 
therefore unprotected by Fifth Amendment privilege.188  The conjoined 
reading of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment that seems hinted at in In re 
Search of a Residence in Oakland would be counter to the common modern 
reading of the two amendments as covering fundamentally different 
spheres.189  It would be easy to dismiss In re Search of a Residence in 
Oakland as a “baffling” decision unlikely to affect the wider body of law.190 
To dismiss In re Search of a Residence in Oakland is to dismiss a wider 
change in society, and it could mean dismissing an opportunity for the courts 
to confront that change.  The Supreme Court, in Riley and Carpenter, has 
recognized that changing technology, and the opportunity for its abuse, 
means that an “equilibrium-adjustment” is necessary in how the courts weigh 
the balance between government power and individual rights.191  Were the 
courts to embrace the reasoning within In re Search of a Residence in 
Oakland, and re-embrace at least some of the reasoning behind Boyd, the 
 
186.  See Duong, supra note 106, at 335; see also Choi, supra note 5, at 193 (“Somehow, texts 
that were originally intended to limit government authority have become instruments used to expand 
it.  Our Constitution of limited government has gotten twisted into a government of limited 
Constitution.”). 
187.  See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Search Warrants and Compelled Biometric Access to Phones, 
REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 15, 2019, 5:11 AM), https://reason.com/2019/01/15/ 
search-warrants-and-compelled-biometric (“I agree that the compelled biometric provision is 
impermissible.  But I mostly disagree with Judge Westmore as to why that’s the case.”); Josephine 
Wolff, Biometrics vs. the Fifth Amendment, SLATE (Jan. 17, 2019 11:24 AM), https://slate.com/ 
technology/2019/01/fifth-amendment-biometrics-fingerprint-search-warrant-ruling.html 
(“Magistrate Judge Kandis Westmore . . . issued a ruling denying a search warrant that dealt with 
both Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and profoundly misunderstand the latter.”). 
188.  Id. 
189.  See In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1013-14, 1014 n.1 
(N.D. Cal. 2019). Contra Alito, supra note 158, at 36 (discussing the “quite different” and 
“differently regulated” nature of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment vis-à-vis search and seizure as 
opposed to subpoena.) (“A search or seizure operates on inanimate objects and does not require the 
cooperation or even the presence of those who may be adversely affected. A subpoena, by contrast, 
is directed to a person and seeks to compel his cooperation.”). 
190.  See Wolff, supra note 187. 
191.  See Orin Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 97 
TEX. L. REV. 767, 770 (2019) (citing Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011) (introducing the concept in the Fourth Amendment 
context).  
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courts could ensure that individual rights, especially in regard to digital 
devices and the biometric locks that are so commonly used with them, are 
fundamentally protected at a time when technology could allow government 
power to grow exponentially.192  Such a change would not be a “death knell” 
for law enforcement, but simply mean that law enforcement must consider 
the conditions required for two amendments instead of one.193  In a time 
where person and inanimate object are as conjoined as people and their smart 
phones are, and where cooperation of one is often needed to access the other, 
considering the search and seizure together with the subpoena may now be 
reasonable.194 
As technology races forward at blinding speed, the light of discovery 
can still leave us in the dark as to how to use that technology, and what it 
means it for our rights.  A “jurisprudential lodestar,” a line of reasoning to 
help courts and scholar articulate standards when balancing technology, 
government interests, and individual rights, could help us navigate this ever-
changing era.195  In re Search of a Residence in Oakland may be too small a 
decision to be that lodestar, but it does provide a line of reasoning for other 
courts to consider on an issue that the courts must consider in the future.196  
Ultimately, it may provide the glimmer of a new path for higher courts to 
walk, a path that would lead to more comprehensive protections for American 
civil liberties, or at least for American smartphones.197 
 
192.  See generally Choi, supra note 5, at 248.   
193.  Id. at 241; see also In re Search, 354 F. Supp 3d. at 1014 n.1 (“Probable cause does not 
permit the Government to compel a suspect to waive rights otherwise afforded by the Constitution, 
including the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.”). 
194.  Supra note 186. 
195.  See Terzian, supra note 112, at 307. 
196.  See People v. Davis, 2019 CO 24, ¶21, (referencing In re Search of a Residence in 
Oakland. 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2019)) (“Specifically, courts have begun considering 
whether the Fifth Amendment allows the government to compel an individual to provide it with his 
phone passcode or to use a biometric feature such as a fingerprint to unlock his phone.”)); See also 
Seth Rosenblatt, Despite ruling, pro-privacy biometric laws still face long road to change in U.S., 
THE PARALLAX (Jan. 17, 2019), https://the-parallax.com/2019/01/17/biometric-privacy-ruling-
slow-change/ (“[o]ver the last 5 to 10 years, magistrates [like Westmore] have been the leading 
voices on this stuff . . .  It’s probably is just a matter of time that a case jumps through all the hoops 
you’d need to reach an appellate court.” (quoting Brett Max Kaufman, staff attorney for the ACLU 
Center for Democracy)). 
197.  See U.S. v. Wright, Case No. 319CR00012MMDWGC1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1414, 
2020 WL 60239 (D. Nev. Jan. 6, 2020), referencing In re Residence in Oakland at 24-25 ([T]here 
are fundamental. . .differences between using a biometric feature to unlock a device and submitting 
to fingerprinting or a DNA swabFalse The Court therefore finds that . . . unlocking of Defendant’s 
phone with his face . . . violated Defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights because the unlocking of the 
phone with Defendant’s face was a testimonial act.”). See also People v. Davis, 2019 CO at ¶21, 
referencing In re Residence in Oakland (“Specifically, courts have begun considering whether the 
Fifth Amendment allows the government to compel an individual to provide it with his phone 
passcode or to use a biometric feature such as a fingerprint to unlock his phone.”).  See also Seth 
Rosenblatt, Despite ruling, pro-privacy biometric laws still face long road to change in U.S., THE 
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PARALLAX (Jan. 17, 2019), https://the-parallax.com/2019/01/17/biometric-privacy-ruling-slow-
change/ (“. . .over the last 5 to 10 years, magistrates [like Westmore] have been the leading voices 
on this stuff. . .It’s probably is just a matter of time that a case jumps through all the hoops you’d 
need to reach an appellate court.”) (quoting Brett Max Kaufman, staff attorney for the ACLU Center 
for Democracy). 
